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The Constitutional Court was seized with an opportunity to deal with an issue of eligibility for 
elections to the office of the president. This matter arose out of the fact that the 2016 
constitutional amendments introduced some notable changes regarding the tenure and term 
limitation on the office of president. What prompted the applicants to apply to the Constitution 
Court for interpretation on eligibility against the backdrop of the constitutional changes in 
2016, was that in 2014, the office of the president fell vacant following the demise of the Fifth 
President, Mr Michael Sata. In accordance with the provisions of the constitution at that time, 
elections were held, and the then Minister of Home affairs, Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu was 
elected to the office of president and completed the unexpired term of office of the departed 
president, which begun in 2011. It must be understood that at the time when Mr Lungu assumed 
the office of the president in January 2015, there was only a year and a few months remaining 
before the next general elections in 2016. Whilst in office, Mr Lungu, signed the Constitution 
Bill into law, which introduced a number of changes that also touched on term limitation for 
the office of president. The above chronicle of events is what set in motion the court process 
inviting the Constitutional Court to pronounce itself on the eligibility of Mr Lungu to stand as 
president in 2021; whether he could be said to have had already twice held office of president, 
firstly elected in 2015, and secondly re-elected in 2016.   
 
Significance  
Evidence regarding the imposition of term limits on public office holders can be traced as far 
back as the 7th century BC. At that time the citizens of the Greek state of Dreros-on-Crete 
prescribed a law that placed absolute restrictions on the number of times that any person can 
serve in the office of the state’s chief magistrate.2 
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Aristotle in one of his writings placed premium on the need for public offices to be held 
rotationally so to afford a chance to every citizen to aspire to hold public offices. He asserts: 
 
…the characteristics of democracy are as follows: the election of officers by all out of 
all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and 
skill, should be made by lot.....that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not 
often, or in the case of few except military officers; that the tenure of all offices, or of 
as many as possible, should be brief.3 
 
There are many reasons why the concept of term limit is characterised as a feature of democracy 
and an institutional barrier to personal rule and dictatorship. According to Linz, presidents 
exercise what he terms “uni-personal power", which can very easily be abused and potentially 
contribute to the demise of democracy4. This view is also echoed by Maltz when he contends 
that term limits are an important feature of presidential government, as they help to brake an 
electoral authoritarian regime‘s descent into outright dictatorship. The popularity of 
presidential term limits therefore reflects a recognition that this office, more than any other, 
needs to be rotated on a regular basis in order to ensure the survival of democracy.5 
 
In many African states, it was after the cold war, that a broad consensus emerged in favour of 
democratisation and consolidation of democratic institutions. Some of the mechanisms adopted 
included strengthened legislature, decentralisation, and protection of judicial independence. 
Limits on the duration and number of terms a president may hold office is one of these 
mechanisms. They are now seen as part of the toolbox to protect democracy together with 
regular and fair elections, and the protection of fundamental rights embedded in African 
constitutional fabrics.6  
 
However, this cherished toolbox of democracy is facing a serious strain in many African states. 
Presidential term limits have been put to their severest tests in Africa. The results have been 
mixed. In some cases they have survived, while in others, they have been made malleable so 
                                                             
 
3 Aristotle, the politics, Book VI, Section II  
 
5 Maltz, G. ‘The Case for Presidential Term Limits’ (2007) Journal of Democracy 128,142. 
6 HK Prempeh ‘Progress and retreat in Africa: Presidents untamed’ (2008) Journal of Democracy 109; HK 
Prempeh ‘Presidential power in comparative perspective: The puzzling persistence of imperial presidency in 





as to gift an incumbent a third term. Modern third term bids are highly sophisticated and can 
be difficult to arrest especially where the courts are fronted to lender a veneer of legality by 
coming up with ‘inventive’ and highly questionable interpretations of the constitution. This 
was the case for President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, where the Constitutional Court 
decided that, although the Constitution limits presidents to two terms, President Pierre 
Nkrunziza’s first term did not count because on that occasion he was not elected by people of 
Burundi but by parliament.7 
 
In Zambia, presidential term limitation first became a feature of the Zambian Constitution in 
1991. The idea behind a term limit was to prevent a person from becoming a ‘life president.’ 
This was after witnessing the damaging effects of personal prolonged rule of the first President, 
Kenneth Kaunda.8 Presidential term limit was and still remains a progressive feature of the 
Constitution, and has since become a fixed star of Zambia’s constitutional democracy. Article 
35 of the 1991 Constitution was couched as below: 
 
 (1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five 
years. 
 (2) After the commencement of this Constitution no person who holds or has held 
office as President for two terms of five years each, shall be eligible for re-election to 
that office. 
 (3) For the purposes of clause (2) the period of two terms of five years each shall be 
computed from the commencement of this Constitution. 
 (4) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker 
of the National Assembly resign his office. 
 (5) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution 
shall unless:  
(a) he resigns his office; or  
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37  
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved;  
                                                             
7 Tull, Denis & Simons, Claudia (2017), ‘The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits 
in Africa’ (2017) Vol. 52, No.2 Africa Spectrum 
8 N, Simutanyi & M, Njekwa ‘One Party Dominance and Democracy in Zambia’ (Centre for Policy Dialogue,6 





continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President 
assumes office. 
 
What one observes under the 1991 Constitution is that the limitation in holding of the office of 
president was based on having served two terms of five years each. Under this constitution, a 
person who held office for two terms of five years each became ineligible for re-election to the 
office. It can, therefore, be deduced that under the 1991 constitutional arrangement, if a 
president decided to resign in the fourth year of his second term of office, he would be eligible 
to come back at any time to contest the position of president on account that he did not serve 
the two terms of five years each as required by the constitution. Given this premise, it is safe 
to conclude that under the 1991 constitution, holding of the office of President was tied to the 
term of office. 
 
In 1996, the 1991 Constitution was amended substantially, and these amendments touched on 
the office of president. In terms of Article 35, the constitution as amended in 1996 provided: 
 
(1) Subject to clause (2) and (4) every President shall hold office for a period of five 
years. 
 (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution or any other 
law, no person who has twice been elected as President shall be eligible for re-election 
to that office.  
(3) The President may, at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker 
of the National Assembly, resign his office.  
(4) A person assuming the office of the President in accordance with this Constitution 
shall, unless:  
(a) he resigns his office;  
(b) he ceases to hold office by virtue of Article 36 or 37; or  
(c) the National Assembly is dissolved;  
continue in office until the person elected at the next election to the office of President 
assumes office.  
 
The 1996 Constitution, as can be observed here, introduced a major change in wording. 
Admittedly, the tenure of office was maintained to be five years. However, unlike the 1991 





each, the 1996 amendment provided to the effect that any person who has been elected twice 
as president would not be eligible to contest for re-election. What is critical to appreciate is that 
the 1996 amendments delinked tenure office from term limit, which were previously united 
under the 1991 constitution. The effect of this change was that regardless of the period that one 
has served as president, it counts as a term as long such a person has been elected.  For argument 
sake, if one was elected under the 1996 amendment as president, and after one week in office, 
decides to dissolve parliament, and general elections are held, the period of one week in the 
office would be regarded as a term on account that he has been elected to the office of President. 
Consequently, such a person would only be eligible for re-election to the office of President 
one more time. Explained differently, if a president decided to resign in his second term, say, 
after being in the office for only one year, such a person would be ineligible for re-election on 
account that he has been elected twice as president, notwithstanding that he only served for a 
year in his second term. In a nutshell, the 1996 constitution, term limitation was not based on 
length of a period that one serves in the office, but on account of how many times one has been 
elected to that office. And in this context, having been elected twice to the office of President, 
according to the 1996 constitutional amendment, cripples any person’s presidential ambitions. 
 
In 2016, there were substantial amendments to the constitution that equally reflected on the 
office of president in the following terms: 
 
Article 106.    
 (1) The term of office for a President is five years which shall run concurrently with 
the term of Parliament, except that the term of office of President shall expire when the 
President-elect assumes office in accordance with Article 105. 
(2) A President shall hold office from the date the President-elect is sworn into office 
and ending on the date the next President-elect is sworn into office. 
(3) A person who has twice held office as President is not eligible for election as 
President. 
(4) The office of President becomes vacant if the President— 
(a) dies; 
(b) resigns by notice in writing to the Speaker of the National Assembly; or 
(c) otherwise ceases to hold office under Article 81,107 or 108. 
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of President, except under Article 81— 





(b) if the Vice-President is unable for a reason to assume the office of President, 
the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to— 
(i) make an appointment; or 
(ii) dissolve the National Assembly; 
and a presidential election shall be held within sixty days after the occurrence of the 
vacancy. 
(6) If the Vice-President assumes the office of President, in accordance with clause 
(5)(a), or a person is elected to the office of President as a result of an election held in 
accordance with clause 5(b), the Vice-President or the President-elect shall serve for 
the unexpired term of office and be deemed, for the purposes of clause (3)— 
(a) to have served a full term as President if, at the date on which the President 
assumed office, at least three years remain before the date of the next general 
election; or 
(b) not to have served a term of office as President if, at the date on which the 
President assumed office, less than three years remain before the date of the next 
general election. 
 
The tenure of office under the 2016 amendment still remains five years. There is, however, a 
fundamental change in terms of term limitation. While under the 1996 constitutional 
amendment, the limitation was based on having been elected twice, under the 2016 
constitutional amendment, the limitation is premised on one having twice held office of 
president. Therefore, in terms of Article 106(3), a person who has twice held office as president 
is not eligible for re-election to that office. The change in terminology from ‘elected twice’ 
under the 1996 constitutional amendment to ‘holding office twice’ under the 2016 amendment 
is a response reflecting the introduction of the running mate clause in the Constitution. The 
introduction of the running mate clause in the Constitution now entails that a running mate can 
assume the office of president in the event that the office falls vacant without going through an 
election. Simply put, if the office of president falls vacant, under the present constitutional 
arrangement, the vice president automatically assumes the office of president to fill the vacancy 
without the need for elections. 
 
What is, however, critical is the retention of the term limit under the 2016 constitutional 
arrangement. The term limit under the current constitution is not any different from the 1996 





‘holding office twice.’  The rationale in the distinctive employment of terms has already been 
explained above; the response to the introduction of running mate clause.  The net effect of the 
discussion under the 2016 constitutional amendment in terms of term limitation is that a person 
who has twice held office as president is ineligible to stand for re-election. 
 
Moving forward, arising from the introduction of the running mate clause in the 2016 
constitution as amended, Article 106(6) provides for reckoning of time in circumstances when 
the vice president assumes power to fill the vacancy in the office of President. In other words, 
this provision provides the manner of computing what constitutes a full-term when the vice 
president or an elected person in lieu of the vice president assumes power to fill the vacancy in 
the office of president. 
 
The gist of the provision is that if the vice president assumes power to fill the vacancy in the 
office of the president, and there are at least three years remaining before the date of the next 
general election, that period will count as a full term. In other words, as long as there are at 
least three years remaining before the next general elections, the vice president or an elected 
person who assumes office of the president midway will be deemed to have served a full term 
of five years notwithstanding that he/she will only have been in the office for less than five 
years. In a case such as this, in terms of eligibility, such a person can only be eligible for re-
election to the office of president for a further one term. If on the other hand, the vice president, 
at the time of assuming power as president arising from the vacancy in the office of president, 
there are less than three years remaining, such a period will not be regarded as a full-term. 
Consequently, such a person will be deemed not to have held office at all, and as such eligible 
for election to the office of president twice. A lesson to be picked at this point is that where a 
person who occupied the office of vice president or any person in lieu of the vice president, 
assumes the office of president to fill the vacancy, and there are less than three years before the 
date of the general elections, such a period served will not count as a full term, as a result, a 
person who completes such a period will still have two chances to be elected as president. 
 
As earlier stated in the introduction, the applicants requested the court to interpret Article 106 
and pronounce itself on whether Mr Chagwa Lungu would be eligible to stand in 2021 
following the demise of his ‘second’ term of office which started in 2016 September. In effect, 





2015 and got re-elected in re-elected in August 2016, would be eligible to stand for re-election 
as President in 2021. 
 
The Constitutional Court suggestively regarded Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu as one who assumed 
power under Article 106(6) and stated that since the period from 2015 January to 2016 August, 
was less than three years, the incumbent would not be regarded as having served a full term.  
 
What is intriguing and strikingly questionable is why the Constitutional Court seemed to have 
fitted the incumbent within Article 106(6), when it is in fact very clear factually that the 
circumstances under which the incumbent assumed the office of president are completely 
different from those falling under Article 106(6). For avoidance of doubt, Article 106(6) relates 
to the vice president who automatically assumes the office of president to fill the vacancy on 
account of having been the running mate or a person who gets elected to fill the vacancy in the 
office of the president in lieu of the vice president. 
 
Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu was not in any of these circumstances for the Constitutional Court to 
extend the provisions of Article 106(6) to his case. He was neither the vice president nor was 
he elected to the office of the president owing to the inability of the vice president (running 
mate) to assume power automatically. In any case, Article 106(6) is a feature that responds to 
the relationship between the office of president and the vice president (as a running mate) where 
a vacancy occurs in the office of president. Now, there was no running mate clause under the 
1996 constitutional amendment, under which Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu was first elected. The 
question, therefore, is: how were these provisions that do not even with the stretch of 
imagination fit into Mr Edgar Lungu’s circumstances palpably availed to him? 
 
How then should have the Constitutional Court interpreted the circumstances of the incumbent 
and his eligibility to stand in 2021? Since we have discounted the constitutional provisions 
under Article 106(6) from applying to the facts under which the incumbent (Mr Edgar Chagwa 
Lungu) assumed the office of president, the Constitutional Court should have simply based its 
interpretation of the eligibility of the incumbent on Srticle 103(3) as read together with Article 
106(2). Article 103(3) provides to the effect that a person who has twice held office as president 
is not eligible for election. Obviously, at this point, the question that arises is: what does 
‘holding office’ mean? The answer seems to appear in Article 106(2), the said Article provides: 





on the date the next president elect into office is sworn into office.”  From this provision, it 
becomes clear that holding office of president commences from the time that the president elect 
is sworn into office until the time another president elect is sworn into office. It inevitably 
follows, therefore, that a person who has been sworn into office as president is said to have 
held office. Arising from the factual and legal analysis above, the next question would be: was 
Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu sworn into office in January 2015? The answer is a resounding yes. 
Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu was sworn into office as president in January 2015 and ending the 
day when the next president elect was sworn into office in September 2016, who in this case 
was himself upon getting re-elected. The key in settling the question of holding office is the 
issue of being sworn into office. If a person was at any point sworn into office as president, 
then such a person has held the office of president from the period of being sworn into office 
until the next president elect is sworn into office. Holding office has nothing to do with the 
period one has served as president. To the contrary, holding office is linked to being ‘sworn 
into office.’ If one has been sworn into office as president, such a person has held office 
regardless of the period served. The issue of how long one has served as president only becomes 
necessary if such a person assumed the office of president as vice president to fill the vacancy 
in the office of president. In such a case it becomes necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 
106(6), which looks at whether the remaining period before the next general elections are held 
is at least three years or less. It is only at this point that one would correctly assert that the term 
of office is attached to the holding of office. Article 106(6) is a ‘locked’ provision, which is 
only to be opened up in strict and specific circumstances as discussed above. Therefore, making 
a wholesale pronouncement on this provision that holding office is attached to the term office 
is adulterating the Constitution.  If a person did not assume the office as president under 
circumstances spelt under Article 106(6), the length of time one has served as president has no 
bearing at all on ‘holding office’. The implication is that under the current arrangement, apart 
from the assumption of office of the president under Article 106(6), a person cannot be sworn 
into office as president more than twice.  
 
A closer look at the decision of the Constitutional Court reveals that this decision has the effect 
of nullifying term limits, which has been a cherished virtue since 1991. The interpretation that 
the Court places on Article 106(3) as read together with 106(6) has the capability of plunging 
the country into a constitutional crisis. To put this observation into context, paragraph 108 of 






Previously, the limitation on eligibility for election to the office of president as 
provided in the repealed Article 35 was premised on the fact that a person had 
been twice elected, even, when the person was required only to serve the 
remainder of the term of office of his predecessor. 
Under the current constitutional regime, however, the holding of office as 
president is attached to the term of office as defined in Article 106(1) and (6) 
read together. While Article 106(1) provides the presidential term is 5 years, 
Article 106 (6) defines what constitutes a full-term 
 
Further on J83, the Court reasoned as follows: 
 
It follows that the Sub-articles in Article 106 cannot be isolated from each other in 
interpreting the article. As we have already stated above, an interpretation that isolates 
the provisions touching on the same subject is faulty. Therefore to state that Article 
106(3) applies to the term that straddled two constitutional regimes but that Article 
106(6) does not, is to isolate 106(3) from the rest of the provisions in Article 106 which 
is untenable at law and is at variance with the tenets of constitutional interpretation, as 
all the provisions on the tenure of office of the president must be read together. We are 
of the considered view that the provision regarding the full-term must be applied to 
defining what is meant by twice held office under 106(3) in interpreting the provisions 
of that Article. 
 
With due respect to the Constitutional Court, the above interpretation is a serious mutilation of 
the Constitution. It is incorrect to say that the holding office is now attached to the term of 
office. ‘Holding office’ is still independent of the term of office just like the term ‘elected 
twice’ under the 1996 constitution as amended had no bearing on the term of office. According 
to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation, any person who serves in the office of president 
for less than three years would be regarded not to have held office. This position is extremely 
dangerous and has the effect of wiping out the concept of term limit. To unmask the absurdity 
of this interpretation, take for instance President B gets elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, 
if he decides to resign in 2023 after only exhausting 2 years 11 months of his five year mandate 
in his second term, remaining with 2 years 1 month before the next general elections, President 
B would be regarded as not having held office since the period he will have served is less than 





2026. And if he gets elected in 2026, he can as well decide to resign in 2028 before he clocks 
three years in office and return to stand again in 2031. If elected in 2031, there is nothing to 
stop him from resigning in 2033 so that he is eligible to stand again in 2036, and if on this 
occasion he decides to finish the term, President B will have ruled for a total of 16 years. In 
accordance with the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, there is nothing to stop this 
ingenious, but undesirable circumvention of the Constitution. Effectively, the interpretation of 
the Constitutional Court has robbed the Constitution of this critical bulwark of term limit, and 
potentially re-introduced ‘life president’ and its incessant evils. This is the crisis that this 
judgment creates; a constitutional crisis where the constitution lies helpless in as far as nipping 
off selfish personal and sectional interests is concerned. 
 
Although what the Court said on J83 is not so fundamentally different from what appears on 
J77, which has been addressed above, it is important to point out a few things relating to the 
text on J83. Firstly, the Court holds that Sub-Articles 3 and 6 of Article 106 must be read 
together in order to get a holistic picture and meaning. This appears to be a wrong approach, 
because the two sub-articles are dealing with two distinct issues namely, limitation on 
eligibility (sub-article 3) and reckoning of time in considering what constitutes a term of office 
when a vice president or someone is elected in lieu of the vice president to fill the vacancy in 
the office of president (sub article 6). These two are distinct and have no bearing on each other 
at all. What is clear here is that Article 106(3) and (6) are only united in interpretation when 
dealing with the situation of filling up a vacancy in the office of the president and not at any 
other time.  
 
Perhaps as a point hope, it is worthwhile to indicate that the interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court did not pronounce itself on the rights of the Mr Edgar Chagwa Lungu to stand as he was 
not a party to the case, and had not indicated firmly his intention to stand. Consequently, this 
case was largely hypothetical and an academic interpretation of the constitutional provisions 
dealing with the issue of eligibility. As a result, the Constitutional Court has a chance to 
extricate itself from this interpretation, which effectively obliterates the presidential term limit. 
In having a ‘second bite at the cherry’ the Constitutional Court in 2021, can unwrap itself from 
this web of constitutional crisis by declaring the incumbent ineligible to stand in line with the 






In a nutshell, Zambia faces a pernicious third term campaign and the inexorable consequences 
thereof. Unlike the failed 2001 third term bid by the late President Chiluba, whose illegality 
was ‘naked’ to everyone’s eye, the current third term bid is subtle and benign as it comes clad 
in some misplaced garments of legitimacy provided by the Constitutional Court. Yet, when 
stripped to its barest, it is simply a third term bid akin to Nkurunziza’s of Burundi. This is a 
ferocious indictment on the Constitutional Court’s ability to stand tall as the last bastion in 
defence of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
